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There is a burgeoning literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Bryan 
Frances’ book, Disagreement, is a well-written and thorough introduction to the 
epistemic issues surrounding this philosophical issue. This timely book is introductory in 
nature and provides an excellent launching point for entering into the contemporary 
debate on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Disagreement borders both 
theoretical and applied issues in epistemology with a focus on real-world applications. 
Frances’ book exemplifies careful and systematic philosophical thinking and employs the 
method of cases. The book progresses in a systematic manner, with clear definitions, 
accessible examples, review chapters, as well as sample study questions. To help student 
and professor alike, the book also has progress summaries scattered throughout. The book 
is split into two sections: the first clarifies the central questions relevant to the 
epistemology of disagreement and the second analyzes some intuitive answers. In what 
follows we will provide an overview of the book and raise several critical points. 
 
In the first section, Frances sets out the relevant questions by way of a number of test 
cases and extensive practical examples and puts forward several principles for further 
examination in the second section. Frances identifies two questions as central to the 
debate over the epistemic significance of disagreement:  
 
Disagreement Question: How should I react to the realization of a 
disagreement? 
 
Better Position Question: Which participant(s) in the disagreement are in 
a better position to correctly answer the question?  
 
Frances argues that answering the Better Position Question is central to answering the 
Disagreement Question. He claims that there are three epistemic statuses relevant to the 
Better Position Question: epistemic peer, inferior, or superior. Epistemic superiors are in 
a better epistemic position than epistemic inferiors whereas epistemic peers are roughly 
on the same epistemic level as each other. Frances highlights the following disagreement 
factors as relevant for one’s position on a question: data, evidence, time, ability, 
background (non-factual) knowledge, and circumstances of investigation (26).  
 
In brief, data encompasses the facts about the disagreed upon belief in question; evidence 
includes the propositions and facts that you use to support your doxastic attitude; one can 
spend more or less time thinking about a problem than others; ability refers to a person’s 
cognitive abilities, meaning a person might have more or less natural ability when it 
comes to thinking about the problem (e.g. a person might just be more math-
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another person); background knowledge is all other relevant information that an 
individual can bring to bear on the disputed topic; and finally the circumstances of the 
investigation can differ, which means there could be some temporary factors that affect 
one of the party’s ability to reason (e.g. drunkenness, sickness, distractions, etc.). 
 
Frances then proposes three seemingly reasonable rules of thumb for dealing with 
disagreement: Peer Rule, Superior Rule, and Controversy Rule. Briefly, the Peer Rule 
states that if you justifiably believe, before the disagreement, that you and your 
disagreeing interlocutor are peers, you should suspend judgment; the Superior Rule says 
that if, before disagreement, you justifiably believe that your disagreeing interlocutor is 
your superior, then you should change your belief and your superior can keep their belief 
(the opposite goes for if they’re your inferior); and the Controversy Rule states that if 
your belief in B is highly controversial amongst the general public, but a large amount of 
experts agree with your belief, then you can keep your belief in B.  
 
In the second section of Disagreement, Frances proceeds to critically examine and refine 
these three rules of thumb. Frances proposes a number of additional cases that appear to 
be counterexamples to each of the initially intuitive rules for dealing with disagreement. 
Frances revises the rules in question, but in turn presents additional candidate 
counterexamples to the revised principles as well. In the end we are left without any 
universal principles to follow in responding to disagreement. 
 
Frances then turns to discussing different versions of two influential principles in the 
literature on the epistemology of disagreement: Uniqueness and Independence. 
According to Uniqueness, one’s evidence reasonably supports one and only one unique 
doxastic attitude, or level of confidence, toward the proposition in question; all other 
competitor doxastic attitudes are unreasonable. According to Independence, your belief 
regarding a person’s epistemic status (as a peer, superior, or inferior) must come from 
evidence other than the evidence that supports your belief in question.  
 
Finally, Frances returns to addressing the Disagreement Question, ultimately arguing that 
there is no clear cut answer; there are some cases in which it is reasonable to retain your 
belief and yet other cases where it is unreasonable to retain your belief. In the final 
chapter, Frances raises the skeptical worry stemming from disagreement – that 
disagreement could have it that we’re far less justified in believing a number of 
controversial propositions that we believe.  
 
We turn now to raising several criticisms.  
 
Frances distinguishes several relevant beliefs in cases of disagreement: 
 
P: the belief that the other party is your peer, 
S: the belief that the other party is your superior, 
D: the belief that a genuine disagreement is taking place, and  
B: the belief upon which you and your interlocutor disagree.   
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Frances claims that, in cases of disagreement where the subject has much better overall 
evidence for B (the target belief) than for P (the peerhood belief), it is typically 
reasonable for her to stick with B (146). Whether this is so depends upon how we think of 
the evidence supporting the claim that one has made a mistake. Putting things in terms of 
defeaters, if we think about the evidence that someone is your peer and disagrees as a 
rebutting defeater for your belief B, then what Frances claims will likely be correct. 
However, if such evidence is better conceived of as an undercutting defeater for B, then it 
is hard to see how Frances’ claim could be correct.1 Undercutting defeaters (unlike 
rebutting defeaters) need not be as justified as the beliefs they are undercutting in order to 
be full defeaters.2 So, central to this issue will be the nature of such disagreement 
evidence and how it functions, yet it is not clear if, or why, the rebutting defeater 
approach that Frances seems to defend is more fitting. 
 
Frances’ focus in Disagreement is mainly on the rational response to disagreement (how 
one should update their beliefs), where this is a distinct issue from what one’s total 
evidence supports at the time. While both issues are worthy of attention, it seems to us 
that the question of how one should rationally respond is of less interest than the question 
of what one should believe at the time in question. As Frances notes, one can have a 
rational reaction to a disagreement even if they have been unreasonable in dealing with 
the relevant beliefs prior to discovering the disagreement (so long as one uses those 
beliefs correctly in updating) (143, 167). In such cases, Frances claims that keeping the 
belief is reasonable even though the belief kept is not (200). While the distinction 
between rational responses and rational beliefs is helpful (and clearly made by Frances), 
we take it that the core question in the epistemology of disagreement concerns rational 
beliefs rather than rational responses. Along those lines, further treatment of that issue 
would have been beneficial. 
 
In sum, Frances’ Disagreement is an accessible and well-argued introduction to the 
debates surrounding the epistemic significance of disagreement. We recommend this 
book to those interested in exploring this rich epistemological topic. 
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